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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LYNNO MATT HARRY, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, Director 
of Driver License, State of 
Utah, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 19745 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
e Ann. § 41-2-19.6 
1983, declared as 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondent seeks to have Utah Cod|< 
(1953) as amended, and effective August 1, 
constitutional on its face and as applied ±|n this case as a civil 
public safety statute of the State of Utah/ and as held by the 
trial court below. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURTl 
The district court denied appellant1s petition and 
upheld the Department of Public Safety, Driver License Service's 
decision subsequent to hearing as not being!arbitrary or 
j : ••• :. '• 
capricious, holding the civil public safetyjstatute to 
constitutional and violative of due process! 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the trial court logic and 
decision upheld. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Department and the arresting officer followed the 
procedures exactly as set forth in the civil statute, Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-2-19.6 (effective August 1, 1983). See addendum for 
all relevant statutory citations. At the time of arrest, the 
petitioner was "personally served" with a Uniform DUI Citation on 
which was contained the words "NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUSPEND." The 
citation specifically warned the individual that 31 days from the 
date of "this notice" the privilege to operate a motor vehicle in 
the State of Utah would be suspended pursuant to the cited 
section. "You have the right to request a hearing on this 
suspension. The Department will not contact you further 
regarding a hearing unless you request a hearing in writing. 
YOUR WRITTEN REQUEST must be sent WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS of the 
date of arrest to the office of Driver License Services . . . 
"Upon your written request for a hearing you will be notified of 
a time and place to appear. If you fail to appear or request a 
hearing your driver license suspension will be automatic. The 
administrative hearing is civil in nature and does not satisfy 
the requirement for your to appear in court as indicated above." 
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The written notice was given on kn official numbered 
departmental form as required by statute. The driver obviously 
received it as Mr. Harry requested an opportunity for a hearing 
and was granted a hearing by agreement of j:he parties on. The 
hearing examiner gave Mr. Harry an opportunity to testify and 
challenge the two statutory issues that he would determine. His 
testimony on actual physical control of the vehicle was 
corroborated by the information contained on the Uniform DUI 
Summons inf ormation,-and the official notarized and sworn to 
report by the police officer. Mr. Harry did not contest the 
breathalyzer test results of .10% BAC nor the officer's sworn 
statement that he was (1) sitting in the "driver's seat", (2) 
with the keys "in the ignition", and (3) in the "on position." 
R. 12, DUI Report Form. The driver, in fact, admitted that he 
was sitting in the vehicle, R. 12, and admitted "yes, it could 
have been moved." T. 27. 
The hearing examiner considered l^ is testimony and its 
believability as well as the reports and otjher facts and 
circumstances to make his decision. T. 27, 
evidence and testimony received at this hea|] 
the officer had sufficient reason to believ 
violation of U.C.A. § 41-6-44 and that the driver did have a .08% 
or greater BAC test results. The only thing that Mr. Harry 
(2 8. Based upon the 
[ring, he found that 
the driver was in 
choose to challenge at the hearing was whet her or not he was in 
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actual physical control. T. 17. However, after his opportunity 
for hearing, the prior served "Notice of Intention to Suspend" 
and letter of 90 day suspension effective on the 31st day from 
the arrest and subsequent to the hearing, was sustained by the 
hearing examiner. T. 9. 
At the trial the Court considered two issues. (1) The 
constitutionality of the statute and the due process that was 
rendered; and (2) whether or not the hearing examiner or the 
Department of Public Safety was arbitrary or capricious. T. 32, 
36, 38. Appellant offered exhibits of a two-month prior letter 
requesting 200+ blank subpoenas. It was dated more than two 
months prior to the date of the hearing before the Department. 
The exhibits were denied admission by the Court, as well as was 
respondent's offer to submit the departmental policy to allow 
subpoenas to individuals for officers and the subpoena forms 
prepared by the Department for use by drivers in specific 
hearings. T. 41 (See addendum for offered forms). 
The verdict of the criminal trial was not before the 
hearing examiner, and not admitted by the district court. (T. 24) 
INTRODUCTION 
The destruction of life and property caused by drunk 
drivers has long been recognized as a major national problem. 
Alcohol is responsible for an estimated annual economic loss of 
$21 to $24 billion, and at least 50 percent of all highway 
-4-
deaths. Presidential Commission on Drunk driving. Final Report 
(Nov., 1983) p. 1. Exhibit A. 
Utah's problem is equally severe^ In 1980, 150 people 
lost their lives in alcohol related accidehts. Recommendations 
of the Governor's Commission on Drinking and Driving (Nov. 5, 
1982) p.6. Exhibit B. With property damage, injury and death 
caused by alcohol the economic and social loss to Utah alone is 
staggering — in Utah the estimated economic damage is 
$20,385,000 lost because of alcohol caused deaths alone in just 
1981. Id. Add the 263 deaths for 1982 and 283 for 1983 and the 
Utah death toll alone for three years staggers to an economic 
loss of around $94,095,000. The majority ( 73.2%) of the driver's 
contributing to alcohol related fatal accidents had a blood 
Mtah standard. The 
lied was .14%. 
alcohol content much greater than the .08% 
average blood alcohol content of drivers kip 
(Statistics for 1983.) Utah Traffic Accidelnt 1983 Summary (July 
1, 1984) p. 27. Exhibit C. 
lof drunk driving and 
Offering and lives, 
s which deal with 
In an effort to curb the problem 
thus lessen economic losses and save pain s^  
Utah and many other states have enacted law 
alcohol impaired drivers swiftly and efficiently through a civil 
administrative driver license suspension process rather than ' 
through the slower criminal process. 
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POINT I 
THE STATUTE IS CONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS FACE AND SHOULD 
BE PRESUMED TO BE CONSTITUTIONAL BY THIS COURT 
Petitioner merely alleges the unconstitutionality of 
the new statute, however, the Utah Supreme Court grants a strong 
presumption that legislative enactments are constitutional. See 
Zamora v. Draper, 635 P.2d 78 (Utah 1981). The cases also 
suggest that the petitioner will have to make a clear showing 
that the statute is unconstitutional on its face or that it 
cannot be constitutionally implemented. 
Under this presumption, the Utah Supreme Court in Utah 
Farm Bureau v. Utah Insurance Guarantee Assoc.. 564 P.2d 751, in 
challenging the constitutionality of the Insurance Guarantee 
Association Act, quoting Pride Club v. State, 408 U.S. 238, 92 
S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972) said that, "this court makes 
every reasonable presumption in favor of constitutionality and 
will not nullify a legislative enactment unless it is clearly and 
expressly prohibited by the constitution." Utah Farm Bureau, 
supra at 753. 
The Utah court further said in the case of Sims v. 
Smith, 571 P.2d 586, challenging a criminal penalty statute 
quoting from the case of Pride Club v. State, 25 Utah 2d 333, 481 
P.2d 669 (1971), that ". . • a statute should be held valid 
unless there is a clear, complete and unmistakeable violation of 
some specific provision of the constitution." The court also in 
-6-
iously meant what it 
quotes said that this principle of a presumption of constitution-
ality was so basic that it "mn&l be observed in deciding the 
matter." (Emphasis added.) The court obvi 
said, as in Pride ClubF it struck an obviously unconstitutional 
phrase to cure a constitutionally infirmed statute. See also In 
Re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1084 (Utah 1981), where!the court said, "It is 
the duty of this court to construe a statute to avoid 
constitutional infirmities whenever possible. Cf. Munsee v. 
mn£££, 12 Utah 2d 83, 363 P.2d 71 (1961).T The Utah court also 
quoted the same language from the United States v. Delaware and 
Hudson Company, 213 U.S. 366, 407, 29 S.Ctj 527, 535, 53 L.Ed. 
836 (1909) . 
Further we submit that the statute is constitutional on 
its face as it complied with the constitutional requirements in 
that it provides the individual with reasonable notice and an 
adequate opportunity for hearing prior to kny action being taken, 
in a civil matter, with a civil privilege tfo drive. See Greaves 
V, State, 528 P.2d 805 (Utah 1974), Mackey jv. Montrym. 443 U.S. 
at 13, 99 S.Ct. at 2618, stating that "something less than an 
evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to 
action." Quoting Dixon v. Lovef 431 U.S. 1] 
1723, 1727, 52 L.Ed.2d 172 (1977). The Supreme Court also seemed 
to uphold a system and reach down into the 
Illinois and reversed an appellate court decision excluding a 
adverse administrative 
05, 113, 97 S.Ct. 
appellate level of 
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police officer's affidavit that did not specify the grounds which 
led him to believe that the respondent was driving while under 
the influence of alcohol. Such seems to be the thrust of this 
petitioner's argument. In Illinois v. Batchelder, id., the Court 
said, "Indeed it is the affect of the appellate court's opinion 
on the Illinois effort to halt this carnage that has prompted our 
summary action in this case. . . . Clearly then, the fact that 
11-501.1 (d) provides for a predeprivation hearing abundantly 
weighs this second part of the Eldridge analysis in favor of the 
constitutionality of the Illinois implied consent scheme." 
(Emphasis the Court). The Illinois system allowed the admission 
of the affidavit of the police officer in a criminal case and 
this was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
POINT II 
UTAH'S DUI LAWS SATISFY DUE PROCESS GUARANTEES 
In the tradition of according the "states great leeway 
in adopting summary procedures to protect public health and 
safety," the United States Supreme Court has sanctioned the 
prompt civil laws requiring revocation of driving privileges. 
Mackey v. Montrym. 443 U.S. 1 99 S.Ct. 2612, (1979). In Mackey 
v. MontrymF the Court upheld Massachusetts' implied consent 
system under which the petitioner's driver license was revoked 
for refusing to take a breath test. In analyzing the 
constitutional sufficiency of the Massachusetts' system, the 
-8-
Court, following the balancing tests in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 
U.S. 319 (1976), considered three factors in holding that the 
prehearing revocation and the due process question. It 
considered (1) the nature and weight of th4 private interest at 
stake — t h e driving privilege; (2) the ri^k of erroneous 
deprivation, and value of alternative procedural safeguards; and 
(3) the governmental function, state interest, and administrative 
or fiscal burdens at stake. 
A. Private Interest is Minimal and 
Statefs Interest is Great 
In considering the first and third of these three 
factors, the Court recognized that drivers 
their licenses. Mackey, jLd. at 12. It also recognized the 
do have an interest in 
ssed above, in 
ivers from the road, 
substantial governmental interest, as discdi 
promptly removing impaired and dangerous dr; 
and keeping them off through an efficient administrative process. 
Id. at 17-19. 
The Utah Operator and Chauffeur1 si License Act, Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-2-1 (n) and (o) (1983), as amended, defines a 
driver's "license" as a privilege, and evidence of a privilege to 
drive in the State of Utah. It is a privil^ 
constitutionally protected in the State of 
Statfir 559 P.2d 1302 (Utah 1979), however, 
have a constitutional right to drive an autf 
ege that is 
Utah, Ballard v» 
a driver "does not 
pmobile upon the 
public highways (particularly so, when he h&s been drinking 
-9-
alcoholic beverages.) The right to drive upon the highv ays is a 
privilege conferred subject to conditions; and it may be revoked 
if those conditions are violated." Smith v. COY (Utah 1980)f 609 
P.2d 1332, 1333. Hence we see this Court has held, as have 
virtually all courts in the Nation, that the privilege to drive 
is not as fundamental as life or liberty, and that the 
privilege's nature, and weightiness is not so fundamental as to 
require an "error free" determination. See Gree.nholtz v. 
Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. at 7, 99 S.Ct. at 2103, not 
requiring the full penalopy of process, and Mackey v. Montrym, 
(U.S. S.Ct.) inLCja. . ':'-
In Hiding v. Dirkswater, 366 N.W.2d 54 (Minn. 1983), 
the Supreme Court of Minnesota in holding that the statutory 
section mandating suspension of a driver license before failure 
of a chemical test by registering an alcohol content of .10 BAC 
or more was not violative due process, set the example for other 
states, by comparing its Minnesota system with the Massachusetts 
system using the comparison in Mackey v. Montrym. That Court 
held on page 60 that "the private interest effected here is the 
same as in Montrym," and considered the (1) duration of the 
revocation, (2) the availability of hardship relief and (3) the 
availability of prompt post-revocation review. 
Tn Til inn-is v. Batnhplder, 103 S.Ct. 3513 (1983), 
another implied consent case, the court weighed the extent of the 
-10-
private privilege. As in Utah, under the Suspension system at 
issue in Batchelder, a driver could request a hearing, and, as in 
Utah, the driver license would not be suspended until after an 
adverse hearing decision. In Mackey, the Suspension occurred 
prior to the hearing. Thus, the Batcheldej: court explained that 
"in Mackey, our concern centered on 'ft]hejduration of any 
potentially wrongful deprivation of the property interest.1" JLd. 
at 3516. However, because under the Illinois system, unlike the 
Massachusetts system> a driver could not Ipse his license until 
after the requested hearing, the court concluded that the 
"respondent can seek no solace in the first step of the Eldridge 
analysis." Id. The court concluded that the driver in 
Batchelder had little or no interest at stake because he retained 
his license, unaffected prior to the hearing. 
As in Batchelder, a driver licence is not suspended 
under Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-19.6 until after the requested 
hearing. Because of this, the duration of the wrongful 
suspension that concerned the Mackey Court is non-existent and 
the driver's interest minimal. 
The third prong of the Montrym/EJJdridge balancing test, 
the governmental interest has partially be^n discussed above. 
The governmental interest includes the devastating economic loss 
and loss of life for which alcohol-impaireq drivers are 
responsible and the corresponding interest in remedying the 
problem. 
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The governmental interest also encompasses the method 
of the remedy. That is, the state has a great interest in, for 
example, keeping its officers on the roads instead of in court or 
at hearings. It also has an interest in the "fiscal and 
administrative burden" that would be imposed using other 
remedies. Mackey, supra, at 18. Thus, the Mackey Court 
recognized that states have a substantial interest in promptly 
removing impaired and dangerous drivers from the road and keeping 
them off through an efficient administrative procedure. 2d. at 
17-19. 
B. The Utah System Minimizes the 
Chance of Erroneous Deprivation. 
Analyzing the second leg of the Eldridge balancing 
test, the risk of erroneous deprivation, the Montrym court found 
that the flexible due process clause does not require a perfect 
error-free standard. The Court stated: 
The Due Process Clause simply does not mandate 
that all governmental decision making comply 
with standards that assure perfect, error-free 
determinations. Greenholtz v. Nebraska Ppnal 
Inmatesf supra at 7. Thus, even though our 
legal tradition regards the adversary process 
as the best means of ascertaining truth and 
minimizing the risk of error, the "ordinary 
principle" established by our prior decisions 
is that "something less than an evidentiary 
hearing is sufficient prior to adverse 
administrative action." Dixon v. Lovef supra, 
at 113. And, when prompt post deprivation 
review is available for correction of 
administrative error, we have generally 
required no more than that the predeprivation 
procedures used by designed to provide a 
-12-
reasonable reliable basis for concluding that 
the facts justifying the official action are 
as a responsible governmental official 
warrants them to be. See, e.g. Barry v. 
Barchir post, at 65-66; Mathews vj Eldridger 
424 U.S. at 334. 
Id. at 13. Thus, in considering the second prong of the Eldridge 
test, the nature of the administrative suspension system should 
be examined, as should the nature of relief from or judicial 
review of an adverse agency decision. Both must be weighed and 
balanced against the governmental interest!in health, safety, and 
welfare and administrative and financial burdens. 
As the U.S. Montrym decision stated, the Due Process 
Clause standard does not require an "error-[free" agency decision. 
So long as prompt judicial review of the suspension decision is 
available, it does not require an evidentiary hearing prior to 
the suspension of an individual's driver license. Dixon v. Love 
Id. 
In Utah, prompt judicial relief irom suspension 
decision is available. Under Section 41-2-|l9.6 (5) , Utah Code 
Ann. (1953) as amended, (see addendum) drivers may file a 
petition to the reviewing court within 30 days after the 
suspension. Not only is relief prompt, but the chance that the 
license of a driver, operating a vehicle, with a BAC of less than 
.08% will be suspended is almost non-existent. The risk is 
minimized by: (1) the police department check; (2) it is an 
organized official form that must be sworn to and mailed in 
-13-
promptly; (3) public safety reviews of the record; (4) an 
opportunity to testify at a hearing, (5) prompt review by any 
"court of record11 in the driver's "county" of residence, and (6) 
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court* 
Utah's administrative license suspension system even 
further protects drivers against the risk of erroneous 
deprivation. Unlike the system at issue in Montrym, in Utah a 
driver license is not suspended until after the driver has been 
afforded an opportunity for a hearing. Although the Constitution 
does not require an evidentiary hearing prior to adverse 
administrative action, Montrym, jLd. at 13, at the hearing in 
issue competent evidence was taken. Documentary evidence was 
examined, and, importantly, the driver testified supporting parts 
of that sworn document. 
The documentary evidence taken into account at the 
hearing consisted primarily of the DUI Uniform Citation and the 
DUI Report Form. These reports are required by the statute, on 
forms only approved by the Department of Public Safety and sworn 
to and must be returned promptly (5 days), and become part of 
their official records. T. 26 and Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-19.6(3) 
and (4). These documents are trained officer's reports which are 
obtained by the Department of Public Safety through the ordinary 
and regular and only business channels. The documents contain 
information regarding the cause for the arrest, the arrest and 
the officer's contact with the driver aftef the arrest. The DUI 
report form must be sworn to by the arresting officer, notarized 
and checked again requiring another "authorized endorsing 
signature." 
Administrative reliance on documents similar to these 
trained officer's reports was upheld by th^ Montrym Court without 
the requirement of correlative officer testimony. (See also 
Batchelder, id.) Characterizing the information contained in 
such reports as "objective" and obtained by a "trained observer 
and investigator", JLcU at 13 and 14, the Mcbntrym Court found it 
easy to uphold the Massachusetts system which predicated license 
revocation on documentary evidence alone. The Court explained 
that the officer's report was sufficient evidence on which to 
base the license revocation because: 
The District Court, in holding|that the Due 
Process Clause mandates that an Opportunity for a 
further hearing before the Registrar precede a 
driver's suspension, overstated frhe risk of error 
inherent in the statute's initial reliance on the 
corroborated affidavit of a law Enforcement 
officer. The officer whose report of refusal 
triggers a driver's suspension i^ a trained 
observer and investigator» He is, by reason of 
his training and experience, well suited for the 
role the statute accords him in the presuspension 
process. And, as he is personally subject to 
civil liability for an unlawful arrest and to 
criminal penalties for willful misrepresentation 
of the facts, he has every incentive to ascertain 
accurately and truthfully report the facts. liie 
specific dictates of due process must he shaped hy 
"the risk of error inherent in the truth finding 
process as applied to the generality of cases" 
rather than the "rare exceptions*" Mathews v. 
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Eldridge,. . • And, the risk of erroneous 
observation or deliberate misrepresentation of the 
facts by the reporting officer in the ordinary 
case seems insubstantial* (Emphasis added.) id. 
at 14. 
Thus, because of the obvious r e l i a b i l i t y of the off icer ' s sworn 
report in the "general" cases, the Supreme Court upheld the 
Massachusetts1 implied consent system which prefaced license 
revocation solely on the officer's report. 
Bolstering their position, the Court noted that 
Montrym, like most drivers, "did not dispute the facts" contained 
within the officer's report. Id. 2612. Similarly, most drivers 
in Utah who request a hearing pursuant to U.C.A. § 41-2-19.6 do 
not dispute the factual accuracy of the officer's report, nor 
make preparations to have him present in advance. Rather, as in 
Montrym, they choose to challenge the constitutionality of the 
statute under which their licenses may be suspended, complaining 
of technical jury-type evidence considerations. The Montrym 
Court used this fact to illustrate the accuracy and reliability 
of the officer's report and the need for its use in the general 
majority of these cases. 
In this case, the petitioner attempted to show at the 
hearing, that he was not in "actual physical control" of the 
vehicle. However, the challenge was, apparently, directed at the 
legal meaning of "actual physical control" and not the underlying 
factual situation. (Apparent ability to strike was present. See 
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f specifically say, 
states. He, in fact, 
Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651, 654 (JL982) . This driver 
never contended that the keys were not in the ignition. The,,. 
officer's report states, nor did the drive)
that the car was not moving, as the report! 
admitted to the hearing examiner that the par "could have been 
moved." T. at 17, 26-27. 
As in Montrym, on appeal, the petitioner seems to 
challenge only the constitutionality of the law and quibble with 
the evidence taking process. He does not challenge even the 
meaning of "actual physical control" that was at issue at the 
administrative level. The lack of challenge on factually related 
issues, as is true of most cases in which k suspension under Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-2-19.6 is challenged, supports the yiontrym court's 
conclusion, and the conclusion that should be reached here, that 
the officer's report is a factually reliable account of a trained 
observer and may be used in support of an administrative civil 
public safety suspension decision. 
Mr. Harry had an opportunity to testify. The officer's 
report and other documentary evidence was not the only evidence 
relied on by the department in this case. The department also 
used testimonial evidence; the unbelieved testimony of Mr. Harry, 
in support of its suspension decision. T. 28. As previously 
mentioned, much of the testimony supports ihe officer's report. 
Thus, as does the documentary evidence, th4 testimony actually 
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taken in this case also helps to minimize the risk of erroneous 
deprivation. 
Any risk of erroneous deprivation is also minimized 
through requiring the agency to address only relatively simple 
issues. U.C.A. § 41-2-19.6(5) simply requires the department to 
determine (1) whether the arresting officer had reasonable cause 
to believe that the driver was operating a vehicle under the 
influence, and (2) whether the driver1s BAC test results, if any, 
indicated a .08% BAC-or greater. The DUI Report Form and any 
other documentary evidence along especially with the driver's 
testimony permit ready determination of these two simple issues. 
- B e c a u s e the State of Utah requires the officer's 
reports to be sworn, checked and authorized by the chief of 
police or his designate, on contemporaneous sworn official 
departmental forms which are checked by the Department of Public 
Safety, and grants the driver an opportunity for an actual 
hearing prior to any effective suspension of the driving 
privileges, the risk of erroneous deprivation under Utah's new 
DUI laws is slight. This minimal risk, combined with the added 
safeguard of post deprivation judicial review and appeal make 
Utah's DUI suspension system constitutionally sound. 
C. Post Deprivation Relief is Significant 
and Constitutionally Sufficient. 
Although the Montrym Court emphasized the significance 
of post-deprivation relief, the source of relief in Montrym was 
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administrative (because of the summary prehearing revocation) and 
not judicial. Thus, standards of judicial review were not 
directly discussed in Montrym- However, even without specific 
guidelines from Montrym, due process in driver license cases is 
described as a "flexible standard", and it is evident that the 
Utah standard of administrative hearing before any suspension and 
judicial review of license suspension decisions is mane than 
sufficient. 
Section 41-2-20, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, 
requires the reviewing court to determine whether or not the 
Department's suspension decision was arbitrary and capricious 
within 30 days. Therefore, review is prompt and meaningful. 
The Utah Supreme Court has approved the arbitrary and 
j • • • 
capricious standard. Utah Department of Administrative Services 
Vt Public Service Commission/ 658 p.2d 601 
Administrative Services court discussed twd standards of review 
which it denoted "arbitrary and capricious, 
standard discussed, the agency if afforded 
Under this standard the agency should not be reversed if "there 
is evidence of any substance whatever which 
(Ut. 1983) The 
" Under the first 
great deference. 
regarded as supporting the determination made." (Citation 
can reasonably be 
omitted.) Administrative Services/ id. at 
This standard was held to provide1 
sufficient level of review by at least thre 
|609. 
a constitutionally 
le other Utah district 
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courts. None have held it to be unconstitutional. See, e.g., 
Williams v. Schwendiman, Third Judicial District Memorandum 
Decision, Judge Russon, Civil No. C84-2196, June 12, 1984, S.Ct. 
Case No. 20128. And it has frequently been applied by other 
district, judges in examining, and even occasionally reversing as 
arbitrary, departmental suspension decisions. The fact that the 
courts have used this standard in reversing departmental 
decisions logically demonstrates that it is meaningful. 
Other western states, pursuant to their implied consent 
laws, afford agency revocation and suspension decision similar 
judicial deference. For example, both Idaho and Colorado limit 
judicial review to a review to the agency record, and apply the 
"clearly erroneous" or "arbitrary and capricious" standard of 
review. See, e.g. Davis v» Colorado Department of Revenue, 623 
P.2d 874 (Colo. 1981), Mason v. State, 653 P.2d 803 (Idaho App. 
1982). 
Although this "arbitrary and capricious" standard of 
review sufficiently protects the petitioner's due process 
guarantee, the Utah Administrative Services court articulated 
another "arbitrary and capricious" standard which could also be 
employed by a court in reviewing license suspension decisions 
with mixed questions of law and fact. 
Under the second and stricter standard set forth in 
Administrative Service, a court will not uphold an agency 
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decision if there is only "evidence of any substance whatever" 
supporting the determination. Rather, the! reviewing court must 
determine whether or not the agency decisipn "falls within the 
limits of reasonableness or rationality." Administrative 
Services, jsjipjia at 610. This standard of Reasonableness and 
rationalness, which the Administrative Services court denotes as 
a standard of arbitrary and capricious review applies to agency 
decisions involving mixed fact and law questions. Id. at 6Q9-
610. 
As a practical matter this higheR standard is used by 
most reviewing courts even in these simple cases. That is, "was 
the administrative decision reasonable or National." Thus, if 
the reviewing court finds, for example, that the issue of whether 
or not the arresting officer had reasonable cause to believe that 
the driver was driving while under the influence is a mixed 
question, the court likely will apply the higher "arbitrary and 
capricious" standard, substitute its judgment for the fact finder 
and review and check the administrative driver license hearing 
examiner for reasonableness and rationalness. 
Testing the reasonableness and rationality, or the 
substance of the departmental suspension decision based on the 
agency record is a significant and sufficient form of review. So 
significant is this form of review that the New Mexico implied 
consent scheme even employs it for the revijew of the one year 
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license revocations for refusal. State, Department of Motor 
Vehicles v. Gober, 513 P.2d 391 (N.W. 1973)r New Mexico Stat. 
Section 66-8-112(F) (1978). Where one year revocations are 
concerned, Utah, on the other hand, graciously grants a de novo 
review of the revocation decision. A form of review affording 
the agency fact finder no deference. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-
44.10. 
Therefore this Court in Administrative Services grants 
drivers two meaningftil standards of review as required under the 
statutory "arbitrary and capricious'1 review requirement. The 
first standard, allowing greater agency deference is as other 
states have found, constitutionally sufficient. Even if, this 
standard was lacking, Administrative Services makes available a 
higher standard of review under which the reasonableness and 
rationality of the agency decision is tested. Both standards 
provide drivers, like the plaintiff, whose licenses have been 
temporarily administratively suspended, with meaningful judicial 
review of the suspension decision. 
Taken as a whole, Sections 41-2-19.6 and 41-2-20 more 
than protect the due process rights of drivers, like the 
petitioner. Every driver tested must know he is being granted a 
conditional privilege — conditioned on "safety first." The risk 
of erroneous deprivation is slight. The documentary evidence 
which precipitates any suspension action is promptly completed by 
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trained and sworn persons, sworn tof and checked and double 
checked in a reliable, objective fashion. The driver has am 
opportunity to obtain a pre-deprivation hearing at which evidence 
from every available source may be presented. Under 41-2-19.6 
the driver, through the department, may alpo subpoena the officer 
if he believes that the officer's report mky be inaccurate in any 
aspect. The combined available testimony and the reliable 
documentary evidence are considered only regarding two relatively 
simple issues, and, therefore assure accurate agency decisions. 
Then the risk of erroneous deprivation is even further minimized 
through post-deprivation relief in the forip of judicial review 
and appeal. 
When weighed against the individual's interest in his 
driving "privileges" and the state's urgent interest in removing 
hazardous drivers from the highways, the pi|e-hearing 
administrative suspension process more thari adequately protects 
drivers' due process rights. 
POINT III 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE SUSPENSION DECISION 
WAS BASED ON RELIABLE AND COMPETENT LEGAL 
EVIDENCE, THEREFORE NOT REQUIRIjflG THE 
PEACE OFFICER'S PRESENCE 
The lack of the arresting officer's corroborative 
testimony at the administrative hearing serves as the basis of 
the appellant's major claims. The petitioner contends that the 
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arresting officer's presence at the hearing was mandatory because 
it fulfills two functions. First, that the officer's presence 
would satisfy the requirements of the "residuum rule." Second, 
that his presence would satisfy the petitioner's interest in 
cross-examination. 
First, although the applicability of the residuum rule 
to driving privilege suspension cases is unsettled, in any event 
the rule's requirements have been met in this case. The residuum 
rule requires an agency decision to be supported by some 
"competent" evidence. Sandy State Bank v. Brimhall. 636 P.2d 481 
(Utah 1981), Qgden Ironworks v» Industrial Commission, 102 Utah 
492, 132 P.2d 376 (1942). In this case, the hearing officer did 
rely on "competent" testimonial and hearsay evidence in making 
the suspension decision, as was allowed in Zions Cooperative 
Merchantile Assoc, v. Industrial Commission of Utah, (Utah 1927), 
262 P.2d 99. 
If the evidence is an exception to the hearsay rule 
under the Utah Rules of Evidence, the officer's sworn report, 
corroborated or not by testimony, should be competent evidence 
upon which a decision could be based. This Court would have 
allowed that evidence under its own rules if it was a proper 
exception to the hearsay rule, part of the res gestae, even in 
the original case spawning apparently the residuum rule of 
evidence. Garfield Smelting Company v. Industrial Commission, 53 
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Utah 133, 178 P.2d 57 (1918). Of course, this Court has recently 
reaffirmed in Sandy State Bank v, Brimhall, jsiiena at p. 4 86,* 
"that the technical rules of evidence needj not be applied" in 
hearings before administrative agencies and that "hearsay 
evidence is admissible in proceedings befote the Industrial 
Commission and the Public Service Commission." The Court in 
stating that the findings of fact cannot bp based solely upon 
hearsay evidence, but must be supported by! a residuum of "legal 
evidence competent in a court of law", musp have meant that any 
hearsay evidence under the trustworthiness! and reliability 
exceptions to the hearsay rule, corroborated or not, would be 
acceptable* If that is not the rule, we sjibmit that there 
appears here, in the interest of public safetyf a 'fsound reason 
why the minority residuum rule should" not be applied. Sandy 
State Banfcr Ad. 
The officer's report is an exception to the hearsay 
exclusionary rule because this is a civil fatter (fiallard yt CQX, 
595 P.2d 1302, 1304 (1979)), and the sourc^ of the information 
and the circumstances of its preparation indicate 
trustworthiness. See Barney v. Coy, 588 Pl2d 696 (Utah 1978), 
allowing hearsay driver license computerized records as 
"competent" evidence. Additionally, a specific exception for 
these reports is made under Rule 803(1), because they contain a 
first-hand immediate record of the event which is being 
perceived* 
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They are also admissible under Rule 803(6) as being a 
business entry exception or a record of a regularly conducted 
activity made at or near the time in the course of business of a 
regularly conducted business or institutionf (see also Barney v. 
Cox/ .supija) . They would be "competent" and self-authenticating 
under Rule 803(8) as a record and report setting forth an 
activity that the declarant has a "statutory duty to report." 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-19.6. 
The Utah Supreme Court said in Barney v. Cox, supra, a 
driver license records case, "it is the type of evidence which 
will be excepted from the hearsay rule, not the type of 
organization (i.e. private or public) that is important." In 
that case Justice Hall cited the business entries exception of 
Utah Rules of Evidence (Rule 63), and also stated in a footnote 
that, "other subsections of Rule 63 may also apply as exceptions 
including (15) reports and findings of public officials and (17) 
contents of official record." Barney is cited by the framers of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence as being in support of subsection 6 of 
Rule 803 and subsection 8 on public records and reports. Like 
the reports in Barney, the reports in the civil proceedings here 
are ordinarily and regularly obtained by the Department from an 
individual trained to observe and gather the urgently needed 
information in an objective and reliable manner. Mackey v. 
Montrym, SUBLSL* 
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The Utah Supreme Court has upheld the admissibility of 
official records and sworn reports for substantive proof not^only 
in Barney Vt Coxr .supra but also allowed a 
toxology report in Yacht Club v, Liquor Control Commission 681 
P.2d 1224/1227, .supra. Also in Murray City v, Hall, 663 P.2d 
1314 (Utah 1983) , a criminal case, this Co 
sworn official 
urt held that even 
though the results of the breathalyzer test were erroneously 
admitted, as a rule the test results (and the machine testing 
technician's affidavit) are admissible if the judge (or hearing 
examiner) finds them to be trustworthy und^r U.C.A. § 41-6-44.3. 
In that decision Justice Durham logically reasons that: 
It is well recognized that the accused right of 
confrontation is not absolute. See e.g. State v. 
Maestes, Utah, 564 P.2d 1386 (1977). In certain 
instances it must yield to legitimate governmental 
interest. See e.g. State v, WalkeCr supra, 53 
Ohio St.2d at 199, 374 N.E.2d at 136-37. The 
enactment of § 41-6-44.3 manifest an intent by the 
legislature to relieve the State of Utah and other 
governmental entities of the financial hnrd^n and 
inconvenience of calling as witnesses in every 
DUI case the accuracy of the breathalyzer machine. 
(Cite omitted.) Such a concern is a legitimate 
governmental interest* Section 41-6-44.3, devised 
to further that interest, constitutes a very 
limited intrusion upon the accused right of 
confrontation, (Emphasis added.) JLd. at 1321. 
The Murray City Court went on to 
accused feels that the machine was not functj: 
"he/she can subpoena the public officer responsible for testing 
the accuracy of the breathalyzer and the ampoules." See Utah Code 
Anno. § 77-35-14 . See also Stroupe Vt CoMionwealthr supra. [215 
Va. 243, 207 S.E.2d 894 (1974)] The court sjaid: 
point out that if the 
ioning properly 
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Thus, given (1) the legitimate governmental 
interest in not having to produce in every DUI 
case the public officer responsible for testing 
the accuracy of the breathalyzer and the am-
poules, and (2) the alternative means available to 
an accused to cross-examine and confront such a 
witness, we hold that § 41-6-44.3 does not violate 
the appellant's constitutional right of 
confrontation when all of its requirements are 
met. See State v. Walker, supra- [53 Ohio St. 2d 
192, 374 N.E.2d 132 (1978)3 See also People v. 
TenoriQ, 197 Colo. 137, 590 P.2d 952 (1979) 
(stating that there is no violation of an ac-
cused's right of confrontation where the evidence 
is shown to be trustworthy and reliable). 
However,^as previously.discussed, the mandate of § 41-6-44.3 was not meir in tne present case. 
Therefore/* the. results of the ..breathalyzer test 
were erroneously admitted. Id.t at 1322. 
Justice Hall, concurring in that decision, wrote that 
the affidavit submitted in this case was admissible and did meet 
the foundational requirements of the statute. JLcU , at 1322-1323. 
This same fiscal need and urgent public right applies to the test 
results as well as to the officer's sworn report in this civil 
case. 
The criminal case of State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d 1184 
(Utah 1983), also proposes that a jciisLil business record may be 
admitted irrespective of the type of organization from which it 
emanates. There, Justice Stewart pointed out that police records 
(Booking Reports) are admissible depending on the "nature of the 
record" and "the purpose for which they are offered." Even under 
this criminal case these sworn police officer reports, required by 
the civil statute, meet the business entries "and the like" 
-28-
exception to the hearsay rule. This Court again, in that case 
cites Barney v. Cox, £i±gii&r for the statement that "it is the type 
of evidence which will be excluded by the hearsay rule, not the 
type of organization, i.e. public or private, that is important." 
2d. at 1183. Bertul was a criminal case aind involved a conviction 
and a possible jail sentence and should nojt apply in these public 
safety cases being "civil cases" involving no possible fine or 
jail purposes. See Ballard v. Cox, 595 P.2d 1302 (1979). 
We submit that the officer's swprn report is competent 
sworn documentary evidence in a court under the trustworthy 
hearsay exceptions and logic of the Utah Rules of Evidence and the 
reasoning and holdings of the Utah Supreme Court and other courts 
including federal ones. For example, as tjie United States Supreme 
Court said in Mackey v. Montrym, Id. at p. | 13 and 14 and p. 2619: 
[He] is, by reason of his training and experience, 
well suited for the role the statute accords him 
in the presuspension process. And, as he is 
personally subject to civil liability for an 
unlawful arrest and to criminal penalties for 
willful misrepresentation of th£ facts, he has 
every incentive to ascertain accurately and 
truthfully report the facts . .j • The risk of 
erroneous observation or deliberate 
misrepresentation of the facts py the reporting 
officer in the ordinary case sefems insubstantial. 
Moreover, as this case illustrates, there will 
rarely be any genuine dispute a? to the historical 
facts providing cause for a suspension. 
Not only were the requirements of the residuum rule met through 
the competent documentary evidence, but tljiey were also met by the 
direct testimonial evidence of the driver^ relied upon by the 
department, believable or not. 
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Importantly, the driver/petitioner testified. T. at 
28. Although the driver did not fully agree with the officer's 
report, in that he contended he was not in "actual physical 
control" of the vehicle, T. at 17 (an issue which has not been 
pursued by the petitioner) he did confirm that he was behind the 
wheel and that the car "could have been" moving, T. at 17-19 and 
26-27, thus corroborating the officer's admissible sworn report 
with "competent", direct testimonial evidence. 
In this case, the appellant's testimony at the 
administrative hearing, like the reliable documentary evidence, 
served to satisfy the requirements of the residuum of evidence 
rule and since he could have subpoenaed him and had him present, 
due process was granted. 
A. The Presence of the Peace Officer 
Was Not Otherwise Required 
In support of his second proposition, that the 
officer's presence is otherwise necessary to satisfy the 
petitioner's interest in cross-examination, the petitioner cites 
I.C.C. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 277 U.S. 88 (1913). 
The T'ftinsviHe & Nashville language, quoted by the petitioner, 
seems to require a full-blown trial even though the proceeding is 
administrative. But much more limited proceedings are 
constitutionally permissible, and the Louisville & Nashville 
language should not be used to guide the driving privilege 
suspension cases. 
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Two factors immediately distinguish Louisville & 
Nashville from the case at hand. First, ajgencies have been 
accorded much greater freedom over the last 70 years since 
Louisville & Nashville was decided. Theirj expertise and 
convenience made them a valuable, modern necessity. Their 
desirable qualities would be lost, however 
action required a full-blown trial. 
|f if every agency 
involved complex, 
hearing required was, 
Secondly, Louisville & Nashville) 
nationwide rate making. The extent of thej 
accordingly, more elaborate than that where only two relatively 
simple public safety facts and issues are Addressed as in license 
suspension cases. 
Additionally, Louisville & Nashville has been narrowed 
to its facts by the United States Supreme iourt. In 1973 the 
Court, in United States v. Florida East CoAst R. Co., 410 U.S. 
224 (1973), a case factually similar to Louisville & Nashville, 
held that some railroad rate making could lie accomplished without 
the evidentiary hearing it required in Louisville & Nashville, 
even though the statute at issue required a "hearing." The court 
distinguished Florida East Coast from Louisville & Nashville 
saying that one involved "rulemaking" while 
"adjudication.11 However, the principle law 
these cases, as Davis On Administrative Law 
the other involved 
difference between 
points out, is that 
in Louisville & Nashville nationwide rate daking was the issue. 
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While in Florida East Coast only the "specified rates" of a 
single railroad were at issue. K, PaviSr Administrative- Law 
Treatise. §§ 12:4, 14:10 (26 ed. 1976). See also K» PaviSr 
Administrative Law Treatise, § 15.2 (1953). 
Strangely, today, Louisville & Nashvill.fi is largely 
known for its inception of the rule, now accepted nationwide and 
in Utah, that the exclusionary rules of evidence do not apply to 
administrative agencies. See Opp Cotton Willis v. Administrator, 
312 U.S. 126, 155 (1941), and D&LLZ, (2d ed.) £ii£na, at § 16:4. 
Sandy State Bank v. Brimhall, 636 P.2d 481, 486 (1981) affirmed 
that the "technical rule of evidence need not be applied " in 
administration proceedings. 
The history of Louisville & Nashville illustrates the 
trend toward liberalizing administrative proceedings and 
accepting agencies as experts in their fields. Administrative 
officers, like the hearing officer which presided in this case, 
are experienced in Implied Consent cases, breath testing 
machines, and regulations and trained to weigh the evidence 
before them and determine the trustworthiness of that evidence. 
The trustworthiness of the officer's sworn report is 
substantial. The report was sworn to by the officer and also 
double checked and endorsed with the authorized endorsing 
signature as required by the statute. It was received in the 
ordinary and regular course of business through regular, routine 
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departmental channels, on the department1s own statutorily 
required forms. It appears on its face to be properly sworn to, 
verified and notarized. In other words, tne source of the 
information and the circumstances of its preparation indicate its 
trustworthiness, acceptability and admissibility upon which the 
hearing officer could reasonably and naturally rely. Ballard v. 
£nx, .sju»£Ar Barney v, CQXI 588 P.2d 696 (Utah 1978). 
There is no absolute right to cross-examination, 
particularly in the administrative setting! The driver could 
have had the officer there. The Department had forms ready for 
that purpose. Murray City v, Hall, supra and infra. The 
trustworthiness of the report nullifies the need for the 
officer's presence particularly when the driver has an 
opportunity to testify himself. Thus, in Burkhart Vi Department 
of Motor Vehicles, 124 Cal.App.3d 99, 177 Cal.Rptr.. 175 (1981), 
the California Court of Appeals held that the California 
statutory scheme for suspension clauses and that the officer1 s 
hearsay sworn statement could support a firjding even against 
conflicting evidence. The Court pointed out that the officer1s 
hearsay report was an official record of the Department and was 
made specifically admissible by the statut^ 
pointed out that the petitioner could have 
officer himself. The Court's reasoning is 
The Court then 
called the arresting 
persuasive: 
The physical presence of the officer at the 
hearing would not substantially e nhance the 
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reliability of the hearing process. The 
officer and the licensee would engage in a 
swearing match and cross-examination of the 
officer would seldom reveal any weaknesses in 
his testimony, simply because the issues are 
neither complex nor subtle* 
Finally, in reference to the governmental 
interest and the fiscal and administrative 
burdens involved if additional or substitute 
procedures are mandated, we note that 
governmental agencies at the state and local 
level are in a period of fiscal restraint. 
Police manpower resources are finite* it 
does not require the presence of the 
arresting officer at every hearing. The 
licensee has an absolute right to compel his 
attendance if he requests a subpoena, has it 
served and pays the statutory fee (§ 14104.5; 
Gov.Code, § 68097.2). In the event the 
licensee deems the officer's presence 
critical to his defense, the burden is 
properly placed on him to insure the 
officer's attendance. Many licensees may 
prefer that the officer not appear, so as to 
take his chances on his powers of persuasion 
working in the absence of conflicting live 
testimony. (Emphasis added.) Id. at 181. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also specifically held that even in a 
criminal trial the individual's interest in cross-examination 
gives say to a trustworthy report balanced against the economic 
and administrative burden. Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 at 
p. 1321 (Utah 1983). 
The circumstances of this case indicate that the DUI 
report was trustworthy. The appellant does not indicate 
otherwise. Because of this the appellant's due process rights 
and interest in cross-examination have been satisfied, especially 
since the appellant did not make efforts to have the officer 
there.. 
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POINT IV 
THE PETITIONER'S CLAIM THAT HE WAS DENIED THE 
OPPORTUNITY TO SUBPOENA WITNESSES LACKS MERIT 
The petitioner did not attempt to subpoena witnesses or 
obtain subpoenas regarding his administrative suspension hearing. 
T. at 31. Because he made no request for subpoenas (blank or 
specific) he lacks standing to claim that departmental policy 
makes subpoenas unavailable to aggrieved drivers. However, even 
if the petitioner had standing, this claim must fall, for the 
department provides reasonable procedures under which relevant 
witnesses may be subpoenaed. (See addendum subpoena form.) 
Section 41-2-19.6f Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, 
provides that "[iln connection with a [license suspension] 
hearing the department or its duly authorised agents . . . may 
issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the 
production of relevant books and papers." It does not permit the 
issuance of innumerable blank subpoenas upon the request of the 
driver or his attorney. However, the statutory authority to 
subpoena witnesses and evidence are practical and reasonable, and 
prevent neither the acquisition of witnesses or evidentiary 
material. 
An agency's subpoena power is limited to reasonably 
relevant, legal inquiry. See, e.g., State v. D.R. Johnson Lumber 
Co. , 617 P.2d 603 (Or. 1980), State v. Latt^ a. 601 P.2d 520 (Wash. 
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197 9) . The subpoenas the department may issue in anticipation of 
a suspension hearing must be relevant to the fact situation and 
issues involved, such as the officer's reason to believe that the 
plaintiff was driving under the influence, and, for example, the 
plaintiff's driving pattern, the accident, or his performance of 
the field sobriety test. 
The issues and facts are few and uncomplicated. The 
only witness1 testimony that will usually be pertinent to these 
issues is that of the driver and the arresting officer. 
Testimony on, perhaps, the driver's normal state of sobriety, or 
the arresting officer's character is irrelevant, and due to the 
testimony's irrelevancy, issuance of subpoenas for the purpose of 
obtaining this sort of information would be beyond the bounds of 
the department's authority. The issuance of blank subpoenas 
could potentially draw the department outside of its jurisdiction 
and possibly into the criminal area. Thus, the department, with 
its reasonably limited subpoena power, should not issue blank 
subpoenas. 
Because the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) has not 
been adopted in Utah, its provisions are not dispositive. They 
are, however, illustrative. Section 6(c) of the APA provides: 
Agency subpoenas authorized by law shall be 
issued to any party upon request and, as may 
be required by rules of procedure, upon a 
statement, on showing of general relevances and 
reasonable scope of the evidence sought. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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As Davis points out, this section was added by Congress to put 
private parties on the same footing as the 
respect to the acquisition of unprivileged 
Davis, Treatise on Administrative Law, (1953) 8.15. However, the 
availability of information to private parties is limited. 
The words "authorized by law" [in Section 
government with 
information. JL*. 
6(c), APA] prevent the provision from 
granting power to agencies not otherwise 
empowered to issue subpoenas. Trie provision 
returns the previous system of permitting an 
agency to exercise discretion concerning the 
grant of subpoenas on behalf of pro-rate 
parties, but only to the extent of na 
statement or showing of general r 
reasonable scope." (Footnote omij 
Under the APA an agency may and should issue subpoenas, 
but only those relevant to the issues befor 
elevance and 
tted). Id. 
e the agency* 
request for blank subpoenas does not meet the showing of 
for the issuance of 
|tute requires that the 
levant. The department 
relevancy requirement. The same holds true 
subpoenas under Section 41-2-19.6. The sta 
information sought through testimony be rel 
is, therefore, not reasonably authorized to| issue blank 
subpoenas. 
The appropriate procedure would bk for the driver or 
his attorney to request the department to subpoena, for example, 
the arresting officer. See Appellant1s Brief, p. 19. But 
neither specific nor even blank subpoenas were requested in this 
case. T. at 31. In any case had the plaintiff requested that 
particular individual, whose testimony would be relevant, be 
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subpoenaed, and had the department refused to subpoena the 
requested witnesses, the issue would be different. As it is, the 
plaintiff's contention that he should have been issued blank 
subpoenas, lacks merit* 
CONCLUSION 
Statutes are accorded a presumption of validity and 
therefore are assumed valid unless they are clearly 
unconstitutional. The petitioner has not demonstrated that 
Sections 41-2-19.6 and 41-2-20, Utah Code Ann., 1953 (as 
amended), are clearly unconstitutional. Therefore, Utah's new 
civil license suspension system should be presumed valid and 
upheld. 
To test the constitutional validity under the due 
process granted, the individual's interest and state's interest 
must be weighed against the suspension system itself. The 
individual does have an interest in a continued privilege, but it 
is a limited interest, subject to reasonable regulation. The 
license is retained prior to the administrative hearing, only 
suspended and only for 90 days, all deprivation subject to 
judicial review and appeal. 
The State and traveling public have a tremendous 
interest. The effects of DUI have been great, both in terms of 
the economy and in terms of human life, pain and suffering. 
Therefore, there is a crying need in remedying this problem and 
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in remedying it in an efficient way (both fiscally and 
administratively) that will guarantee swiflt and sure results. 
The risk of erroneous deprivation is invalid because: 
1) The trained officer's uniforjm report is sworn to 
and based on reasonable grounds; 
2) The reported information is bhecked before and 
after mailing to the Department for inaccuracies and 
deficiencies; 
3) The driver has an opportunity for a hearing prior 
to any 90 day suspension; 
4) The driver has an opportunity to subpoena 
witnesses; 
5) An impartial public official!has discretion to take 
into account a wide range of evidence, on tw° basic simple 
issues; 
6) The documentary evidence — Officer's Sworn DUI 
Report Form —• is reliable competent and trustworthy; 
7) The privilege is only suspended for a short three 
month period; and 
8) An opportunity for prompt po^t-suspension 
meaningful judicial review is available. 
Therefore, this statute and system is constitutionally 
sufficient especially when considering the state's great interest 
in keeping its highways safe. The Trial Cc|>urt nor the hearing 
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examiner were arbitrary or irrational and, therefore, the court 
should be affirmed. 
DATED this // day of November, 1984. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify I mailed a true and exact copy of the 
foregoing Brief of Respondent, first-class, postage prepaid to 
JoAnn B. Stringham, McRae & DeLand, 209 East 100 North, Vernal, 
TJT 84078. 
DATED this /' / day of November, 1984. 
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Upon the conclusion of such examination the department shall take such action 
as may be appropriate and may suspend or revoke the license of such person or 
permit him to retain such license, or may issue ja license subject to restriction as 
permitted under section 41-2-9. Refusal or neglect of the licensee to submit to such 
examination shall be ground for suspension or relocation of his license. * • 
(h) No report authorized by section 41-2-124 shall contain any evidence of a 
conviction for speeding on an interstate system located in this state if the convic-
tion was for a speed of less than 71 miles per hour and did not result in an accident 
unless authorized in writing by the individual whose report is being requested. 
(i) The department may suspend the license jjrf a person when the department 
has been notified trv a juvenile court that the person has outstanding against him 
21 k l l «*n unpaid fine or uncomplied-with restitution reouirement levied bv order 
Si £. .Juvenile court, and the suspension shall remain in effect until the department 
i§ Notified by the juvenile court that the order hajs been satisfied. No report autho-
rized by section 41-2-12.1 shall contain any evidence of such suspension. 
(\) The department may immediately suspend! the license of a person if it has 
reason to believe that the person is the owner of a motor vehicle with respect to 
which a security is required under Chapter 41 ljf "Title 31; and has operated the 
vehicle or permitted it to be operated within thisTstate without the security being 
iH effect. The provisions of sections 41-12-17.5 and 
render of license plates and registration of motor. 
proof of financial responsibility apply to persons whose driving privilege is sus 
pended under this subsection. If the department 
41-12-29 with respect to the sur-
vehicles and the requirement of 
jexercises the right of immediate 
suspension granted under this subsection (i), the jnotire and.bearing provisions of 
subsection (b) apply. A person whose license suspension has been sustained or 
whose license has been revoked by the department under this subsection may file 
£ petition within SO days after the sustaining of Ithe suspension or the revocation 
for a hearing in the matter which, if held, shall pe"~governed by the provisions of 
section 41-2-20. I 
History C. 1953, 41-2-19, enacted by L. 
1978 (2nd S.S.), ch. 9, § 2; L. 1983, ch. 99, § 4; 
1983, ch 183, § 22; 1983, ch. 187, § 3; 1983, ch. 
192, § 1. 
41-2-19.5. Purpose of revocation or suspension for driving under the influ-
ence- The legislature finds and declares that a prjimary purpose of the provisions 
in this code that relate to suspension or revocationlof a person's license or privilege 
to operate a motor vehicle for driving with a blooq alcohol content above a certain 
level or while under the influence of alcohol or any| drug, or combination of alcohol 
and any drug, or for refusing to take a chemical test provided for in section 
41-6-44.10, is safely protecting persons on roads and highways by quickly removing 
from those roads and highways persons who havd shown they are safety hazards 
by driving with a blood alcohol content above a Certain level or while under the 
influence of alcohol or any drug or combination of alcohol and any drug or by refus-
ing to take a chemical test that complies wit^i the requirements of section 
41-6-44.10. 
Historv: C. 1953, 41-2-19.5, enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 99, § 5. 
Title of Act. 
An act relating to driving while intoxi-
cated; establishing standards relating to, 
penalties for, and procedures to deal with, 
driving while intoxicated; repealing the sec-
tion which formerly set the absolute mini-
mum blood-alcohol content required to con-
vict for driving while intoxicated; and provid-
ing an effective date. 
This ait amends sections 41-2-2, 41-2-20, 
and 41-2-28, Utah Code Annotated 1953, sec-
tion 41-2413, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
last amended by chapter 129, Laws of Utah 
1981, section 41-2-18, Utah Code Annotated • 
1953, as ljast amended by chapter 152, Laws 
of Utah 1979, section 41-2-19, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as enacted by chapter 9, 
Laws of Utah 1978, Second Special Session, 
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41-2-19.6 MOTOR VEHICLES 
sections 43-2-29 and 41-2-30, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as last amended by chapter 
83, Laws of Utah 1967, section 41-6-43.10, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last amended 
by chapter 78, Laws of Utah 1957, section 
41-6-44, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last 
amended by chapter 46, Laws of Utah 1982, 
sections 41-6-44.3 and 41-6-44.5, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as enacted by chapter 243, 
Laws of Utah 1979, section 41-6-44.10, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by chapter 
126, Laws of Utah 1981, section 41-22-14, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by 
chapter 107, Laws of Utah 1971, section 
63-43-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last 
amended by chapter 2, Lawsl of Uuh 1980, 
section 73-18-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as last amended by chapter 183, Laws of 
Utah 1977, and section 76-5-207, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as last amenped by chapter 
63, Laws of Utah 1981; exacts sections 
41-2-19.5 and 41-2-19.6, Utah 4ode Annotated 
1953; repeals and reenacts section 41-6-43, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by 
chapter 242, Laws of Utah 1979: and repeals 
section 41-6-44.2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as last amended by chapter 4,| Laws of Utah 
1982, Second Special Session. — Laws 1983, 
ch.99. 
41-2-19.6. Chemical test — Grounds and procedure for officer's request — 
Taking license — Report to department — Procedure by department — Sus-
pension. (1) When a peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person 
may be violating or has violated section 41-6-44 the peace officer may, in connection 
with his arrest of the person, request the person to submit to a chemical test to 
be administered in compliance wilb the standards set forth in section 4J-6-44.10. 
(2) The peace officer shall advise a person prior to the person's submission to 
a chemical test that results indicating .08% or more by weight of alcohol in the 
blood shall, and the existence of a blood alcohol content sufficient t<|> render the 
person incapable of safely driving a vehicle can, result in suspension 0r revocation 
of the person's license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle. I 
(3) If the person submits to that chemical test and the results indicate a blood 
alcohol content of .08% or more, or if the officer makes a determination, based on 
reasonable grounds to believe that the determination is correct, that the person 
is otherwise in violation of section 41-6-44, the officer directing admiiistration of 
the test or making the determination shall serve on the person, on behalf of the 
department, immediate notice of the department's intention to suspend the person's 
privilege or license to drive. If the officer serves that immediate notice on behalf 
of the department he shall take the Utah driver license or certificate or permit, 
if any, of the driver, issue a temporary license effective for only 30 daysi and supply 
to the driver, on a form to be approved by the department, basic (information 
regarding how to obtain a prompt hearing before the department. A citation issued 
by the officer may, if approved as to form by the department, serve ialso as the 
temporary license. 
(4) The peace officer serving the notice shall send to the department within five 
days after the date of arrest and service of the notice the person's license along 
with a copy of the citation issued regarding the offense, and a sworn report indicat-
ing the chemical test results, if any, and any other basis for the officer's!determina-
tion that the person has violated section 41-6-44, and the officer's belief regarding 
the person's violation of section 41-6-44. Each such report shall be Ion a form 
approved by the department and shall be endorsed by the police chief or his equiva-
lent or by a person authorized by him, other than the officer serving the notice. 
(5) Upon written request of a person who has been issued a 30-day ficense, the 
department shall grant to the person an opportunity to be heard within 30 days 
after the date of arrest and issuance of the 30-day license, but the request must 
be made within 10 days of the date of the arrest and issuance of the 30-cjlay license. 
A hearing, if held, shall be before the department in the county in whkhj the arrest 
occurred, unless the department and the person agree that the hearing rnay be held 
in some other county. The hearing shall be documented and its scope ^hall cover 
the issues of whether a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe jthe person 
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to have been operating a motor vehicle in violation of secjtion 41-6-44, whether tne 
person refused to submit to the test, and the test results, if any. In connection 
with a hearing the department or its duly authorized agent may administer oaths 
and may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the production of 
relevant books and papers. One or more members of the department may conduct 
the hearing, and any decision made after a hearing before |any number of the mem-
bers of the department shall be as valid as if made after |a hearing before the full 
membership of the department Aiter the hearing, the (department shall order, 
either that the person's license or privilege to drive be Suspended or that it not 
be suspended. A first suspension, whether ordered or not challenged under this sub-
section, shall be for a period of 90 days, beginning on th«| 31st day after the date 
of the arrest A second or subsequent suspension under ithis subsection shall be 
for a period of 120 days, beginning on the 31st day after) the date of arrest The 
department shall assess against a person, in addition to! any fee imposed under 
subsection 41-2-8(7), a fee of $25, which must be paid before the person's driving 
privilege is reinstated, to cover administrative costs, and which fee shall be can-
celled if the person obtains an unappealled department-hearing or court decision 
that the suspension .was not proper. A person whose license has been suspended 
by the department under this subsection may file a petition within 30 days after 
the suspension for a hearing in the matter which, if hel^ t, shall be governed by 
the provisions of section 41-2-20. 
History: C. 1953, 41-2-19.6, enacted by L 
1983, ch. 99, § 6. 
41-2-20. Judicial review of license cancellation, relocation or suspension 
— Scope of review. Any person denied a license or whose license has been can-
celed, suspended or revoked by the department except wh^re such cancellation or 
revocation is mandatory under the provisions of this act unless the suspension 
occurred pursuant to section 41-2-19.6 shall have the right jto file a petition within 
thirty days thereafter for a hearing in the matter in a courtj of record in the county 
wherein such person shall reside and such court is hereby Rested with jurisdiction 
and it shall be its duty to set the matter for hearing upon ien cays' written notice 
to the department? t&i thereupon 4# 4«Jte tostim 
e? the efrse «*e fce determine whether the petitioner is e&$ 
examine 4»fc6 -the facts 
titled fcs fe license er is 
'|under4he provisions «ei subject fee cancellation, suspension <a? revocation *A license 
tfes set The court's jurisdiction is limited to a review of tlhe record to determine 
whether or not the department's decision was arbitrary- or capricious. 
History: L. 1933, ch. 45, §20; 1935, ch. 47, 
§ 2; C. 1943, 57-4-23; L. 1983, ch. 99, § 7. 
41-2-21. New license after revocation. (1) Any person kvhose license has been 
revoked under this act shall not be entitled to apply for or Receive any new license 
until the expiration of one year from the date such former license was revoked 
or longer as provided in sections 41-2-18 and 41-2-19. Licenses which have been 
revoked may not be renewed, but application for a new license must be filed as 
provided in section 41-2-8, and a license so issued shall b$ subject to all of the 
provisions of an original license. The department shall not ^rant the license until 
an investigation of-ihe character, abilities and habits of thel driver has been made 
to indicate whether it will be safe to again grant him the privilege of using the 
highways. 
(2) Any resident or nonresident whose operator's e* chauffeur's license to oper-
ate a motor vehicle in this state has been suspended or revoked as provided in this >E 
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41-6-44.2. Repealed. 
41-6-44.3. Standards for chemical breath analysis — Evidence. 
41-6-44.5. Admissibility of chemical test results in actions for driving under the influence 
or with a prohibited blood alcohol content — Weight 
41-6-44.8. 3v$unicipal attorneys authorized to prosecute for driving while license suspended 
or revoked. | 
41-6*44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or drug — Refusal to allow — 
Warning, report, revocation of license — Court action on revocation — Person 
incapable of refusal — Results of test available — |Who may give test — Evi-" 
dence. 
41-6-44.30. Seizure and impoundment of vehicles by category I peace officers. 
41-6-43. Local o rd inances to be consistent with code* (1) An ordinance 
adopted by a local authority that governs a person's driving or being in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle while having alcohol in the blood or while under 
the influence oi alcohol or any drug or the combined infiujence of alcohol and any 
drug, or that governs, in relation to any of those matter^, the use of a chemical 
test or chemical tests, or evidentiary presumptions, or penalties or that governs 
any combination of those matters, shall be consistent with the provisions in this 
code which govern those matters. j 
(2) An ordinance adopted by a local authority that governs reckless driving, or 
driving a vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or prop-
erty shall be consistent with the provisions of this code vfhicb govern those mat-
ters. 
History: C. 19SS, 41-6-43, enacted by L. Compiler's Notes[ 
1983, ch. 99, § 11. LaWc i9g3, ch. 39, § 11 repealed old section 
41-6-43 (L. 1979, |ch. 242, § 12), relating to 
powers of local authorities, and enacted Dew 
section 41-6-43. 
41-6-43.10. Negligent homicide — Death occurring within one year — Pen-
alty — Revocation of license or privilege to drive. {&)! (1} When the death of 
any person ensues within one year as a proximate result c}f injury received by the 
driving of any vehicle in reckless disregard of the safety bf others, the person so 
operating such vehicle shall be guilty of negligent homicidej 
(fe) (2) Any person convicted of negligent homicide shall be punished by impris-
onment in the county jail for not more than one year or by fine of not less than 
$100 nor more than $1,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment 
(e) (3) The department shall revoke the license or permit to drive and any non-
resident operating privilege of any person convicted of negligent homicide. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-43.10, enacted by L. 
1955, ch. 71, § 1; L. 1957, ch. 78, § 2; 1983, ch. 
99,112. 
41*6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol or drug or with high blood 
alcohol content — Criminal punishment — Arrest wjthdut warrant — Suspen-
sion or revocation of license. ^ (1) It is unlawful and punishable as provided 
in subsection (4) ef this section for any person with a blood alcohol content of .08% 
21 greater by weight or who is under the influence of alcohol? or ^eite is under 
the influence *t any drug or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a 
degree which renders the person incapable of safely driving a vehicle, to drive or 
be in actual physical control of *&? a vehicle within this state. The fact that e^y 
a person charged with violating this section is or has beei legally entitled to use 
alcohol or a drug she& does not constitute a defense againsi any charge of violating 
this section. 
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ffe}—ift e w criminal prosecution fer e violation ef subsccti&R {*•) M tirts section 
relating te driving e vehielc while under the influence ef alcohol, 4? 4R efty t m l 
s«4t er proceeding arising eet ef eets alleged te have been ceirrguttod |fe¥ £•**¥ person 
while efiving er «* actual physical control ex e vehicle while undcrj tire influence 
e? alcoher, the amount e# alcohol «r the person's blood et the tote alleged es shown 
fe¥ chemical analysis ef the person's blood, breath, e? other feodily substance eheri 
grve r4se *e t*?e following presumptions: 
(3-)—if there wee et thet t*fi*e &r&6 per eeftt er- iees by weight ef alcohol fe tbe 
person's blood,' t t shall be presumed thet tire person wee set under tire influence 
ef alcohei; 
/ O N T.» ^ J ^ J ^ J ^ A ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ »-• -^ ^ - » N ^ -^ ^ ^ j ^ ^ ^ ^j&. *•> »• «•- ^ «-.— »^ < i \ A ST »•>>••«. -^ ^, — W- V. << 4- I .«-> «•* >> 4 V «- — f\ f \ Q w <^  w. 
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eest by weight ef akohol t» the person's blood, seeh feet shall ftet gtve ?4se 4e 
€tfty picoumption the t the person -wtts er -w^s **et under 4be •influence ef alcohol, 
bet seeh feet «rey be considered witb other competent evidence «jt determining 
whether tbe person wee under the influence eg alcohol; 
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person'? blood, k shall be pre sumoc that the person wee t*nder tbe influence e? 
alcohol;
 % • 
(4j—?be foregoing provisions%ef tbie subsection ebetl fret be eonstrqed es limiting 
tbe introduction ef e^y other competent evidence bearing upon | tbe question 
whether e? ftet tbe person wes under tbe influence ef akohol. I 
(tr) (2) Percent bv weight ol alcohol in the blood shall be based \poii p a m s oi 
alcohol per one hundred cubic centimeters of blood. 
W {3} Every person who is convicted the first time of a violation! of subsection 
(1) of this section shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than 60 days 
nor more than six months, or by a fine of S299, or by both such fine ^nd imprison* 
ment; provided except that i» if the event eeeb person ebeH have ijias inflicted a 
bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having operated ptH the vehi-
cle in a negligent manner, he shall be punished by imprisonment in the county 
jail for not more than one year, and, in the discretion of the court, by a fine of 
not more than $1,000. For the purposes of this section, the standard!of negligence 
shall be is that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care 
which ordinarily reasonable and prudent persons exercise under like ^r similar cir-
cumstances. I 
(e) (4) In addition to the penalties provided herein for in subsection (3), the 
court shall, upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less 
than twe 48 consecutive hours nor more than 10 days with emphasis on serving 
in tbe drunk tank of the jail, or require the person to work in e* alcohol rehabilita-
t*e& facility a community-service work program for not less than two nor more 
than 10 days er and, in addition to the jail sentence or the work in thg community-
service work program, order the person to obtain treatment e t e* participate jn 
an assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility. 
(f) (5} Upon a second conviction within five years after a first conviction under 
this section or under a local ordinance similar to this section adopted in compliance 
with subsection 41-6-43 (1), the court shall, in addition to the penalties provided 
for in subsection 4& (3), impose a mandatory jail sentence of not |ess than twe 
48 consecutive hours nor more than 10 days with emphasis on serving in the drunk 
tank of the jail, or require the person to work in e« alcohol rehabilitation facility 
£ community-service work program for not less than 10 nor more than 30 days 
ef and, in addition "to the jail sentence or the work in the communifrhservice work 
program, order the person to participate in an assessment and educational series 
^
 a
 licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility and the court may, in its discretion, 
order the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility. Upon a 
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or under \ 
section 41 
section {e-
90 days w 
son to wo: 
for not les 
or work ii 
ment at a: 
suesi xe * 
person shi 
tence ^re^ 
Probation 
a local or 
41-S-43 Q 
license su 
subseouen 
has furrni 
inciuamg: 
have been 
(6) Thi 
order a co 
a licensed 
treatment 
at an alco 
to a convi 
unoer suDi 
education 
- with a firs 
as a prior 
applying r 
subsection: 
under sect 
is a first s 
tion under 
hoi rehab! 
provided f ( 
te(JLL 
charge of i 
section 41-
a violation 
for the pk 
drugs, or i 
The staten 
there was ( 
ant, in com 
fbl The 
accepting t 
of a violati 
of guilty 03 
states for t 
tion of botl 
tion shall ' 
this section 
(c] The 
of section « 
ffi subsecti 
64 
TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 41-6-44 
or under a local ordinance similar to this section adopted ml compliance with sub-
section 41-6-43 (1), the court shall, m addition to the penalties provided for m sun-
section (4) (3), impose a mandator jail sentence of not less man 30 nor more than 
90 days with emphasis on serving in the drhnk tank of the jail, or require the per-
son to work in «* alcohol rehabilitation facility a community-service work project 
for not less than 30 nor more than 90 days ^kts and, in additil on to the jail sentence 
or work in the community-service work program, order the person to oEtam treat-
ment at an "alcohol rehabilitation facility. No portion of any Sentence imposed pta*-
suant fee under subsection {4) (3) shall be suspended «er oh all and the convicted 
person shall not be eligible for parole or probation until such time as tfee an^ sen-
tence providccTSer ta *&*s subsection imposed under this section has been served. 
Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation of this section or 
a local ordinance similar to this section ado'pteFln compliance with subsection 
41-6-43 (1) shall not be terminated and the department shall not reinstate any 
license suspended or revoked as a result "of such convictioiL if it is a second or 
subsequent such conviction witKuTfive vears. until and uniesj tne convicted person 
has furnished evidence satisfactory to the department thitTU fines and fees, 
including fees for restitution, and reliaSilitation costs* assessed against the person, 
have been paid. \ 
(6) The provisions £n subsections (4) and (5) that require! a sentencing court to 
order a convictea person to participate in an assessment anq educational series jat 
a licensed alcohol rehabiEtation facility, "^obtain, in the discretion of the court, 
treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility, or "obtain, mandatorily, treatment 
at an alcoliol rehabilitation facility, or do any combination hi those things, apply 
to a conviction for a violation of section 41-6-45 that qualifies zz z prior offense 
uncTer subsection (T), so as to require the court to render tne |same order regarding 
education or treatment at an alcohol "rehabilitation facility, tbr both, in connection 
with a first, second, or subsequent conviction under section Til-6-45 that Qualifies 
as a prior offense uiiBer subsectionT?), as he would renckr in connection with 
applying respectively, the first, seco'nq, or suFseouent conviction reouirements of 
whether a conviction subsections 41-6-44(4) and (5). For purposes of determining 
under section 41-6-45 which qualified as a prior conviction junder subsection (7), 
1§ a first, second, or subsequent conviction under this subsectipn, a previous convic-
tion under either section 41-6-44 or 41-6-45 is deemed a prior conviction. Anv alco-
hol rehabilitation program and any community-based or oth^r education program 
provided for in this section must be approved by the department of social services. 
tf) W) (^ When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guiljty or no contest to a 
charge of a violation of section 41*6-45 or of an ordinance enajcted pursuant to sub-
section 41-6-43(b) in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, £n original charge of 
a violation of this section, the prosecution shall state for the Record a factual basis 
for the plea, including whether or not there had been consumption of alcohol or 
drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant in connection with the offense. 
The statement shall be an offer of proof of the facts which jshow whether or not 
there was consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, by the defend-
ant, in connection with the offense. 
(b) The court shall advise the defendant pr*e? *e #*t cjcccptancc «ef before 
accepting the plea offered pursuant *e under this subsectionj of the consequences 
of a violation of section 41-6-45 as follows: If the court accept^ the defendant's plea 
of guilty or no contest to a charge of violating section 41-6-4$, and the prosecutor 
states for the record that there was consumption of alcohol or! drugs, or a combina-
tion of both, by the defendant in connection with the offense, I the resulting convic-
tion shall be a prior offense for the purposes of paragraph l<4) subsection (5) of 
this section. 
(c) The court shall notify the department t£ raotor vehicles of each conviction 
of section 41-6-45, which shall be a prior offense for the purposes of paragraph 
tf) subsection (5) of this section. 
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(&} (S) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a perscjn for a violation 
of this section when seek the violation is coupled with an accident or collision in 
which seek the person is involved and when eeefe the violation nas, in fact, been 
committed, although not in his presence, if the olticer has reasonable cause to 
believe that the violation was committed by s**efe the person, 
(i) (9) The department of public safety shall revoke suspend for a period of 90 
days tEe operator's t* chauffeurs license of any person convicted'tor'the first Time 
under subsection (1) of this section^ and shall revoke for one veg>r the license of 
any person otKerwise convicted under this section, except that the jdepartment may 
subtract from any suspension period the number of dayslor wEijch a license was 
previously suspended under section 41-2-19.6 if the previous suspension was based 
on the same occurrence which the record of conviction is based upofu 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, £34; C. 1943, than 10 nor more than 3([) days in the first 
57-7-111; L. 1949, ch. 65, §1; 1957, ch. 75, §1; sentence of subset, (f); added "or to obtain 
1967, ch. 88, 12; 1969, ch. 107, § 2; 1977, ch. treatment at as alcohol rehabilitation facil-
268, §3; 1979, ch. 243, §1; 1981, ch. 63, i ^ — i ^ t o . the first sentence of subset, (f); 
1982, ch. 46, § 1; 1983, ch. 99, § 13; 1983, ch. increased the neriods in tie second sentence 
103, § 1; 1983f ch. 183, § 33. 0f subsec. .(f) from not less; than 10 nor more 
Compiler's Notes. than 30 ^ a v s *° DOt ^ess than 30 nor more 
Laws 1983, ch. 183, discontinuing separate t h a r i 0^ days; added -plus] obtain treatment 
classification for chauffeur's license, is effec- * l * E / i c o h o 3 rehabilitation facility to the 
tive January 1,1984/ * second sentence of subiec. (f); inserted 
The 1982 amendment increased the mini- subsec (g);reoesignated farmer subsecs. (f) 
mum term in subsec (d) from 30 to 60 days; a n d W a s * ) £ n d « • 
deleted "not less than S100 nor more than"
 P f f . n 
before "$299" in subsec. (d); inserted subsec. £ - n e c t l v e u a I e -
(e); redesignated former subsec. (e) as (f); Section 2 of Laws 1982, ch. 46 provided 
increased the period of work from not less that the act should take effect upon approval, 
than two nor more than 10 days to not less Approved February 19,1981 
41-6-44JL Repealed-
Repeal, blood alcohol content of .10% or higher, was 
Section 41-6-4^2 (L. 1973, ch. 80, § 2; 1982 repealed by Laws 1983, ch. 99, § 21. 
(2nd S.S.), ch. 4, § 2), relating to driving with 
41-6-44.3. Standards for chemical breath analysis — Evidence. (1) The com-
missioner of public safety shall establish standards for the administration and 
interpretation of chemical analysis of a person's breath including standards of 
training. • 
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to prove that a person 
was driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol or driving with a blood alcohol content e£ .1091 trf greater statutorily pro-
hibited, documents offered as memoranda or records of acts, conditions or events 
to prove that the analysis was made and accuracy tri the instrument were made 
pursuant fee used was accurate, according to standards established in subsection 
(1) shall be admissible if: 
(a) The judge finds that they were made in the regular course of the investiga-
tion at or about the time of the act, condition or event; and 
(b) The source of information from which made and the method and circum-
stances of their preparation were such as to indicate their trustworthiness. 
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established under subjection (1) and 
the provisions conditions of subsection (2) have been met, there &£& fee is a pre-
sumption that the test results are valid and further foundation f^r introduction 
of the evidence is unnecessary. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.3, enacted by L. 
1979, ch. 243, § 2; L. 1983, ch. 99, § 14. 
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TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 
41-6-44.5. Admissibility of chemical test results in [actions for driving under 
the influence or with a prohibited blood alcohol consent — Weight. (1) In any 
action or proceeding in which it is material to prove that a person was driving 
or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or 
with a blood alcohol content e? .1091 ©f greater statutorily prohibited, the results 
of a chemical test or tests as authorized in section 41-6-44.10 shall be admissible 
as evidence. 
(2) If the chemical test was taken within two hours of the alleged driving or 
actual physical control, the blood alcohol level of the person at the time of the 
alleged driving or actual physical control shall be presumed to be not less than 
the level of the alcohol determined to be in the blood by t|he chemical test. 
(3) If the chemical test was taken more than two hou^s after the alleged driving 
or actual physical control, the test result shall be admissible as evidence of the 
person's blood alcohol level at the time of the alleged (driving or actual physical 
control, but the trier of fact shall determine what weight shall be given to the 
result of the test 
(4) The foregoing provisions of this section shall nolt fee construed es 1;siting 
fcke consideration trf application hy &tt trier t? te&t e£ 4fat presumptions eer forth 
i» section 41 G 44., «er shall fcfeey prevent a court from receiving otherwise admissi-
ble evidence as to a defendant's blood alcohol level at tl^ e time of the alleged driv-
ing or actual physical control. 
Historv: C. 1953, 41-6-44.5, enacted by L. 
1979, ch. 243, § 3; L. 1983, ch. 99, § 15. 
41-6-44.8. Municipal attorneys authorized to projsecute for driving while 
license suspended or revoked. Alleged violations of section 41-2-28, which consist 
of the person driving while his operator's or chauffeur's license is suspended or 
revoked for a violation of section 41-6-44, a local ordinance which complies with 
the requirements of section 41-6-43, section 41-6-44.10, section 76-5-207, or a crimi-
nal prohibition that the person was charged with violating as a result of a plea 
bargain after having been originally charged with violating one of more of those 
sections or ordinances, may be prosecuted by attorneys 0f cities and towns as well 
as by prosecutors who are empowered elsewhere in th}s code to prosecute those 
alleged violations. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.8, enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 102, § 1. 
Title of Act. 
An act relating to prosecution of alleged 
violations of section 41-2-28; empowering city 
attorneys of cijties and towns to prosecute 
those alleged violations. 
This act enacts section 41-6-44.8, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953. — LEWS 1983, ch. 102. 
41-6-44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or drug — Refusal 
to allow — Warning, report, revocation of license — Court action on revoca-
tion — Person incapable of refusal — Results of test available — Who may 
give test — Evidence. •£&) (1] Any person operating a rjnotor vehicle in this state 
shall be deemed to have given his consent to a chemical test or tests of his breath, 
blood, or urine for the purpose of determining whether ije was driving or in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood Alcohol content statutorily 
prohibited, or while under the influence of alcohol, an^ drug, or combination of 
alcohol' and any drug as detailed in section 41-6-44, provided £te& st*eh so long as 
the test is or tests are administered at the direction of a peace officer having 
grounds to believe st*db that person to have been drivingj or in actual physical con-
trol of a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol content statutorily prohibited. 
or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and 
E S S ^ ^ 
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any drug as detailed in section 41-6-44. A peace officer shall determine which of 
the aforesaid tests shaTTbe administered. 
No person; who has been requested pursuant fce under this section to submit to 
a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine, shall have the right to select 
the test or tests to be administered. The failure or inability of a pea^e officer to 
arrange for any specific test shall is not fee a defense with regard to taking a test 
requested by a peace officer **er an? it shall not be a defense in any criminal, civil 
or administrative proceeding resulting from a persons refusal to submit to the 
requested test or tests. 1 
(fe) (2]f If ssefe the person has been placed under arrest and has thereafter been 
requested by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the cheb-icai tests 
provided for in subsection {&) (1) of this section and refuses to submit to streh the 
chemical test or tests, st*efe the person shall be warned by a peace officer requesting 
the test or tests that a refusal to submit to the test or tests can result in revocation 
of his license to operate a motor vehicle. Following this warning, unless saek the 
person immediately requests the chemical test or tests as offered by a pfeace officer 
be administered, no test shall be given and a peace officer shall submit a sworn 
report within five days after the date of the arrest that he had ground^ to believe 
the arrested person had been driving or was in actual physical control pi a motor 
vehicle while having a blood alcohol content statutorily prohibited or w|hile under 
the influence of alcohol.or any drug or combination of alcohol and ai^ y drug as 
detailed in section 41-6-44 and that the person had refused to submit to !& chemical 
test or tests as set forth in subsection {&) (1) of this section. Within 20 jdays after 
receiving a sworn report from a peace officer to the effect that such the person 
has refused a chemical test or tests the department shall notify seek the person 
of a hearing before the department If at s«*d that hearing the departrrjent deter-
mines that the person was granted the right to submit to a chemical te^t or tests 
and refused to submit to such the test or tests, or if s**eh the person fails! to appear 
before the department as required in the notice, the department shall Revoke for 
one year his license or permit to drive. The department shall also .assess against 
the person, in addition to any fee imposed under subsection 41-2-8 (7), a fee of $25, 
which must be paid before the person's driving privilege is reinstated^ to cover 
administrative costs, and which fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an 
unappealed court decision following a proceeding allowed under this subseiction that 
the revocation was not proper. Any person whose license has been revoked by the 
department under the provisions of this section shall have the right to §\e a peti-
tion within 30 days thereafter for a hearing in the matter in the distHct court 
in the county in which &zth the person s k ^ reside resides. £wfe The court is 
hereby vested with jurisdiction, and it shall fee k* ee^f *& set the matteJ[ for trial 
de novo upon 10-days' written notice to the department and thereupon *e tjake testi-
mony and examine into the facts of the case and *e determine whether the 
petitioner's license is subject to revocation under the provisions of this eetlchapter. 
^ i l l Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition Rendering 
him incapable of refusal to submit to any such chemical test or tests! shall be 
deemed not to have withdrawn the consent provided for in subsection w (1) of 
this section, and the test or tests may be administered whether such person has 
been arrested or not 
(4) (4} Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of ^uch test 
or tests shall be made available to him. I 
£e) (5) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse or person authorised 
under subsection 26-1-30 (19), acting at the request of a peace officer can v^ithdraw 
blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic or drug content therein. This 
limitation shall not apply to the taking of a urine or breath specimen. Arjy physi-
cian, registered nurse, practical nurse or person authorized under subsection 
26-1-30 (19) who, at the direction of a peace officer, draws a sample of bl^ od from 
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TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 41-6-44.30 
any person whom a peace officer has reason to believe is driving in violation of 
this chapter, or hospital or medical facility at which such sample is drawn, shall 
be immune from any civil or criminal liability arising therefrom, provided such 
test is administered according to standard medical practice. 
&} (6) The person to be tested may, at his own (expense, have a physician of 
his own choosing administer a chemical test in addition to the test or tests admin-
istered at the direction of a peace officer. The failure or inability to obtain such 
additional test shall not affect admissability of the repults of the test or tests taken 
-at the direction of a peace officer, nor preclude norj delay the test or tests,to be 
taken at the direction of a peace officer. Such additional test shall be subsequent. 
to the test or tests administered at the direction of a ij>eace officer. 
(g) {7} For the purpose of determining whether jto submit to a chemical test 
or tests, the person to be tested shall not have the j right to consult an attorney 
nor shall such a person be permitted to have an attorney, physician or other person 
present as a condition for the taking of any test 
$*} i l l ^ a P62^01* under arrest- refuses to submit to a chemical test or tests 
under the provisions of this section,, evidence of refuel shall be admissible in any 
civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of a|cts alleged to have been com-
mitted while the person was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or combination of alcohol and any 
drug. 
. History; C. 1953, 41-6-44.10, enacted by L. 
1981, ch. 126, § 43; L. 1983, ch. 99, § 16. 
Actual physical control. 
To establish actual physical control of a 
vehicle for purposes of this section, it is 
unnecessary' to show actual intent to control. 
the vehicle; intent to control a vehicle may be " 
inferred from the performance of those acts 
which constitute actual physical control. 
Garcia v. Schwendiman (1982) 645 P 2d 651. 
There was an adequate showing that 
motorist was in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle where motorist occupied the 
driver's position behind the steering wheel of 
a motor vehicle with possession of the igni-
tion key and with apparent ability to start 
and move the vehicle; fact that vehicle was 
blocked by a fence and another vehicle and 
could be moved only a few feet did not pre-
clude a finding of actual physical control. 
Garcia v. Schwendiman (1982) 645 P 2d 651. 
The "actual physical control" language of 
..this section should be read as intending to 
prevent intoxicated drivers from entering 
their vehicles except as passengers or passive 
occupants. 
P 2d 651. 
arcia v. Schwendiman (1982) 645 
Proceeding jto revoke license for failure to 
submit to jtest. 
Driver's license revocation proceeding for 
failure to submit to a requested chemical test 
requires projof only by a preponderance of 
the evidence! Garcia v. Schwendiman (1982). 
645 P 2d 651.1 
At a proceeding to revoke a driver's license 
for failure to| submit to a requested chemical 
test, departrrjent of public safety has the bur-
den to show I arrested person was driving or 
in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
in addition %o showing that the arresting 
officer had!grounds to believe that the 
arrested per$on was under the influence; the 
same evidentiary burden must be met in a 
trial de novo] in the district court. Garcia v. 
Schwendimad (1982) 645 P 2d 651. 
Law Reviews. 
Hansen v. Owens — Expansion of the Priv-
ilege against (Self-incrimination to Unknown 
Limits, 1981 l|Jiah L Rev. 447. 
41-6-44.30. Seizure and impoundment of vehicles by category I peace offi-
cers. The legislature finds that it is contrary to the sjafery of the public to leave 
vehicles unattended on public roads. 
(1) If a category 1 peace officer arrests or cites the ariver of a vehicle for violat-
ing sections 41-6-43, 41-6-44, 41-6-44.2, or 41-6-44.10, the officer shaD seize and 
impound the vehicle. I 
(2) Any such officer who impounds a vehicle underr this section shall remove, 
or cause the vehicle to be removed, to the nearest accessible s*fe*e impound yard 
that meets the standards set by rule by the state department of motor vehicles, 
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S T A T E OF UTIAH 
BEFORE THE DEPARIMEMT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
OF1CE OF DRIVER LICENSE SERVICES 
In the Matter of the 
Driving Privileges of: 
Defendant 
S U B P O E N A 
File No. 
All expanses 
service 
be paid 
incurred by the 
of this subpoena will 
by the defendant. 
1£ STATE OF UTAH Sencs Greetings to 
IN THE ABOVE hATTER At© BY AUTHORITY t)F UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
Title 41, as amended, V£ OTWAND YOU, That all lingular business and 
excuses being.laid aside, you appear and attend 
as assigned by the DepartrTent of Public Safety <bf the State of Utah, 
at the following location: _____ 
before a Hearing Officer 
on •the day of 
o!clock .M. then and there to testify in the above-entitled matter new 
, A-D. 19 , at 
pending before the Department # on* behalf of 
for the following reason 
and that you bring vath you and then and there produce the following des-
cribed documents, reports, books, and records, to-wi1 
Disobedience and failure 
to attend iray be punished as a contenpt upon request to the Courts. 
•WITNESS: THE DEPART7€NT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, m and for the 
STATE OF UTAH t h i s day of , A.D. 19 . 
Authorized Signature 
DRIVER LICENSE SERIVCES 
